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Abstract—1 In the domain of smart cards, secured devices must
be protected against high level attack potential [1]. According
to norms such as the Common Criteria [2], the vulnerability
analysis must cover the current state-of-the-art in term of attacks.
Nowadays, a very classical type of attack is fault injection,
conducted by means of laser based techniques. We propose
a global approach, called Lazart, to evaluate code robustness
against fault injections targeting control flow modifications.
The originality of Lazart is twofolds. First, we encompass the
evaluation process as a whole: starting from a fault model,
we produce (or establish the absence of) attacks, taking into
consideration software countermeasures. Furthermore, according
to the near state-of-the-art, our methodology takes into account
multiple transient fault injections and their combinatory. The
proposed approach is supported by an effective tool suite based
on the LLVM format [3] and the KLEE symbolic test generator
[4].
Keywords-symbolic test generation, fault injection by mutation,
smart card vulnerability analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Context
Secured devices such as smart cards, security tokens, and
in a near future mobile phones, are submitted to drastic secure
requirements and certification process. In the domain of smart
card, secured devices must be protected against high level
attack potential as described in [1] (such as multiple attackers
with a high level of expertise, using sophisticated equipments,
etc.). Then, according to norms such as the Common Criteria
[2], the vulnerability analysis must cover the current state-
of-the-art in term of attacks2. Nowadays, a very classical
type of attack is fault injection, that can be conducted by
techniques such as laser attacks [5]. These attacks consist in
modifying some hardware components (memory or buses) in
order to influence the current execution to force, or avoid,
some sensitive operations (such as a pin verification or the
generation of a new random number). In complement with
classical hardware countermeasures, codes are hardened by
software countermeasures (managing integrity counter, re-
dundant conditions, etc.). Vulnerability analysis requires to
1This work has been partially supported by the LabExPERSYVAL-
Lab(ANR-11-LABX-0025)
2We aim here the AVA class, dedicated to vulnerability assessment
take into account faults that can be injected, their logical
impacts, and corresponding countermeasures embedded in the
application code.
B. Fault model and robustness evaluation
A classical approach for fault injection consists in defining
an appropriate fault model and in evaluating the robustness of
the code relatively to this fault model.
1) Binary level fault model: According to the state-of-the-
art, fault models have been proposed for laser attacks [5], [6].
The more realistic model consists in changing a value from
0x00 to 0xFF, or from 0xFF to 0x00 or by a random value
(for encrypted memory). These modifications can apply either
at the level of one bit, or one byte or a group of bytes. In
general a laser attack impacts the code of applications stored
in EEPROM or the data passing through the buses. As pointed
out in [1] laser attack effects consist in modifying a value read
from memory or modifying the execution flow in various ways
(inverting a test, generating a new jump or a calculation error,
etc.). Complementary with brute force approaches simulating
laser attacks at the binary level, some works ([7], [8]) propose
high level attack models (generally at the source code level),
modelling the possible impacts of attacks. For instance [8]
targets variable modification attacks, whereas in [7] the authors
model attacks replacing an instruction by a NOP opcode or
changing the destination address of a branch instruction.
2) Permanent versus volatile fault injection: Depending
where the code is stored, and how laser attacks are conducted,
two different consequences must be considered. A permanent
error corresponds to an effective modification of the program
code. A volatile (or transient) fault corresponds to a fault
injection during a run [9]. Permanent errors do not appear
to be a very realistic model: current smart card platforms
generally contain some system countermeasures to detect the
loading of modified programs (for instance with a checksum
verification). In practice, attacks are conducted during code
execution by introducing volatile faults. Furthermore, whereas
until recently the techniques in term of laser attack reduced
to a single shot per run, several spatial or temporal attacks
must now be considered as plausible. Spatial multiple attacks
consist in modifying two independent binary values, temporal
multiple attacks consist in modifying the same value several
times during a run. Thus, a leading-edge approach in term of
fault injection analysis must encompass volatile and multiple
fault injections.
3) Robustness evaluation: Evaluating the robustness of an
application against fault injection can be seen as the production
and execution of a set of mutants, corresponding to all faulty
behaviours [10]. These mutants can be produced dynamically
or statically. When a dynamic approach is chosen, an execution
is launched and faults are injected during a run, according
to a given fault model. Dynamic mutation approach faces
with the classical incompleteness problem: depending on how
inputs are selected, it is difficult to quantify the robustness
of the considered application. When mutants are statically
produced, they have to be classified using criteria as proposed
in [11]: their dangerousness (in term of elevation of privilege
for instance) and the presence of countermeasures detecting
the corresponding attack. In both cases, if multiple fault
injections must be taken into consideration, we are faced with
the problem of a combinatorial explosion.
4) Development and Certification processes: Assisting the
robustness evaluation process against attacks could be helpful
both during the development phase (handled by the card man-
ufacturer) or during the certification phase (handled by well-
identified third-party security labs3). In both cases, developers
or evaluators must acquire a fine-grained understanding of
code in particular to evaluate the relevance of software and
hardware countermeasures. Source or assembly codes appear
to be a well-adapted level to do that. Finding attacks at the
source code can help vulnerability analysis in complement to
a low level brute-force approach [7] consisting in dynamically
mutating bits, bytes or groups of bytes, in particular when
some well-identified dangerous scenarii must be examined.
C. The Lazart approach
The approach we proposed, called Lazart, targets code
robustness evaluation against multiple and volatile fault in-
jections. We start with a high level fault model, combined
with the identification of sensitive statements, allowing us to
produce (or establish the absence of) attacks. We address fault
injections directly impacting the control flow and then modi-
fying the logic of the applications, in particular attacks by test
inversion (changing the result of a conditional jump). This fault
model is a realistic one due to the fact its encompasses several
data or control flow low level attacks [12] (introducing a NOP
to delete a jump or the assignment of a carry flag, modifying
values impacting the condition, etc.). Furthermore we do not
focus on cryptographic algorithms, generally mainly sensitive
to data mutation, but we target any secured applications such
as authentication and identification processes, digital rights
management codes or banking exchange transactions. Security
weaknesses of these applications can result on control flow
modifications implying for instance verifications of identifica-
tion values, current state variables or the structure of inputs
data.
3Such as Cesti in France.
The Lazart approach is based on the following steps, as
illustrated on Fig. 1:
1) Starting from identified sensitive statements (attack ob-
jective) we compute structural information on the control
flow graph (cfg), corresponding to some reachability
properties.
2) Using previous information we determine which pro-
gram locations are candidate for fault injection and we
produce a unique corresponding mutant.
3) Using a symbolic test case generator and a path-coverage
criterion we evaluate the robustness of the application
producing either some attacks, or establishing the ab-
sence of attacks, or an inconclusive response.
CFG
coloring
inconclusiveattack paths
robustness "proof"
appli.ll
attack objectives
mutation strategy mutant
generation
appli.ll
mutant.ll
symbolic
test case
generation
Fig. 1. The Lazart approach
The main innovative part of Lazart is to encompass the
entire process from a fault model, to the production (or proof
of absence) of attacks. We also take into consideration the
dangerousness of attacks, i.e. fault injections producing an
execution not stopped by some embedded software coun-
termeasures and reaching a sensitive objective. The second
contribution is to address multiple volatile fault injections,
without producing a combinatorial number of mutants. Finally
Lazart implementation works on a (well-known) intermediate
representation, the LLVM format [3] and uses KLEE [4], [13],
a concolic test generator engine taking as input LLVM codes
(files appli.ll). Contrary to source code as C ([7], [8]), an
intermediate format offers a fine enough granularity level for
expressing mutants. Furthermore, it makes easier the relation
between high level and binary level fault models (this later
one corresponding to the real laser attack process).
Section II describes the cfg coloring algorithm computing
reachability properties. Section III explains how the colored
cfg is exploited to determine mutations and gives the algo-
rithms producing LLVM mutants. Section IV explains how
symbolic test generation can be used to evaluate the robustness
of an application and the instanciation of this method using
KLEE. Section V proposes a way to classify attacks, presents
the Lazart tool suite and some experimental results. Finally,
section VI compares the Lazart approach with other works and
gives some perspectives on this topic.
II. CONTROL FLOW GRAPH REACHABILITY ANALYSIS
The first step of the Lazart approach is based on a reach-
ability analysis performed on the cfg of the application. We
introduce a simple example to illustrate this analysis.
A. A simple example
The example we consider consists in a pin verification algo-
rithm presented in [14]. Starting from a naive code (sensitive
to channel and laser attacks), we will see in section V a
more robust implementation. Listing 1 is the C code of the
naive version (function Verify) and Fig 2(a) presents the
corresponding control flow graph produced by LLVM [3].
Basic blocks are identified in Listing 1 by means of comments
and Table I gives the mapping between LLVM block names
and C code lines.
1 # d e f i n e SIZE OF PIN 4
2 # d e f i n e maxTr ies 3
3 t y p e d e f unsigned char BYTE;
4BYTE t r i e s L e f t = maxTr ies ;
5BYTE a u t h e n t i c a t e d = 0 ;
6BYTE p i n [ 4 ] = {( char ) 1 , ( char ) 2 , ( char ) 3 , ( char ) 4} ;
7
8BYTE V e r i f y ( char b u f f e r [ 4 ] ) {
9 BYTE i ;
10 / / BLOCK e n t r y
11 / / No compar i son i f PIN i s b l o c k e d
12 i f ( t r i e s L e f t <= 0) goto FAILURE ;
13 / / BLOCKS bb ( i n i t i a l i s a t i o n ) , bb4 ( loop c o n d i t i o n )
14 / / Main Comparison
15 f o r ( i = 0 ; i < 4 ; i ++) / / BLOCK bb3 ( i ++)
16 / / BLOCK bb1
17 i f ( b u f f e r [ i ] != p i n [ i ] ) {
18 / / BLOCK bb2
19 t r i e s L e f t −−;
20 a u t h e n t i c a t e d = 0 ;
21 goto FAILURE ;
22 }
23 / / BLOCK bb5
24 / / Comparison i s s u c c e s s f u l
25 t r i e s L e f t = maxTr ies ;
26 a u t h e n t i c a t e d = 1 ;
27 re turn EXIT SUCCESS ;
28 / / BLOCK FAILURE
29 FAILURE : re turn EXIT FAILURE ;
30 / / BLOCKS bb6 , r e t u r n : e x i t w i t h t h e r e t u r n v a l u e
31}
Listing 1. A naive implementation of Verify
entry bb bb1 bb2 bb3 bb4 bb5 bb6 FAILURE
10 13 16 18 15 13 23 30 28
TABLE I
MAPPING BETWEEN BLOCK NAMES AND C CODE
B. Basic blocks coloring
The inputs of the coloring algorithm are a cfg and a set
of basic blocks identified as “sensitive”, either because we
want to trigger their execution (block “to be reached”), or to
circumvent it (block “not to be reached”), from the attacker
point of view. For instance, on Listing 1, we may want to
trigger the execution of assignment authenticated = 1
(a) cfg for 'Verify' function
entry:
T F
FAILURE:
bb:
bb6:
bb4:
T F
bb1:
T F
bb5:
bb2: bb3:
return:
(b) Colored cfg for bb5 to be reached
entry:
T F
FAILURE:
bb:
bb6:
bb4:
T F
bb1:
T F
bb5:
bb2: bb3:
return:
(c) Colored cfg for FAILURE not to be reached
entry:
T F
FAILURE:
bb:
bb6:
bb4:
T F
bb1:
T F
bb5:
bb2: bb3:
return:
Fig. 2. Initial cfg of Verify, and two colored graphs
(in block bb5), or to circumvent a failure detection (i.e. not
executing the FAILURE block). Generally speaking, we want
to trigger the execution of instructions allowing us to gain priv-
ileges and we want to circumvent executions corresponding to
countermeasures.
We denote a cfg as a graph (N , E), where N is a set of
nodes4 and E the set of edges. Sons(n) is the set of direct
sons of a node n with respect to E, and Leaf is the set of leaf
nodes. An attack objective O is an element G of N , with the
indication “to be reached” or “not to be reached”. Definitions
2.1 and 2.2 give the coloring algorithm of N depending on
O.
4each node corresponding to a basic block
Definition 2.1: cfg coloring for O =(G, “to be reached”).
• Green is the set of nodes that will eventually reach node
G. It is defined as the smallest set verifying:
Green = {G} ∪ ({n : Sons(n) ⊆ Green}\Leaf)
• Red is the set of nodes that can not reach G. It is defined
as the greatest set verifying:
Red = {n : Sons(n) ⊆ Red)}\{G}
• Yellow is the set of nodes that can or cannot reach G,
depending of the execution flow:
Y ellow = N\(Green ∪Red)
Definition 2.2: cfg coloring for O =(G, “not to be
reached”). When unreachability is targeted, sets Green and
Red in Def. 2.1 are inverted.
Definition 2.3: Orange node. We define a subset of Yellow
as yellow nodes with a red son:
Orange = {n : n ∈ Y ellow ∧ (Sons(n) ∩Red 6= ∅)}
The Lazart tool suite implements the block coloring algo-
rithm according to the previous definitions. Figure 2 illustrates
the results obtained from this algorithm for two objectives:
forcing the execution of bb5 (Fig. 2(b)) and circumventing
the execution of FAILURE (Fig. 2(c)). Consider the following
mapping if colors are not available: green=white, red=black,
yellow=light grey and orange=dark grey.
III. MULTIPLE FAULT INJECTIONS AND MUTANTS
Based on the colored control flow graph, we define a
strategy, called Comp, introducing all possibilities of fault
injections by test inversion targeting the attack objective. Then,
we explain how it can be enforced through mutants.
A. A Fault injection strategy for test inversion
Table II describes how faults are injected, depending on the
current block color. Intuitively, when we are executing a green
block B, the attack objective is satisfied (all paths issued from
B reach a node “to be reached” or circumvent a node “not
to be reached”). Conversely, if B belongs to Red, the attack
objective always fails (all paths issued from B do not reach the
expected block or always reach the unexpected block). Thus,
faults (i.e., test inversion) need to be injected only on yellow
or orange nodes: we avoid red nodes (orange node case of
table II), we favour green node (second to last case of table
II) and otherwise we explore the two consequences of fault
injection (last case of table II). As a consequence, strategy
Node (with two sons) Action
Green do nothing
Red unreachable
Orange force the test inversion to circumvent the red son
Yellow possibly invert the test
with a green son to reach the green son
Yellow possibly invert the test from one son
with two yellow nodes to the other one and vice-versa
TABLE II
COMP: A FAULT INJECTION STRATEGY
Comp always ensures that all red blocks will be circumvented.
Then, if the code execution with faults injection terminates, a
green block will eventually be reached5. We call mandatory
mutation when we force a test inversion (on an orange node),
and optional mutation when the test inversion could take place
or not (on a yellow node).
Example 3.1: Comp Strategy effect on the function
Verify. If we consider the control flow graph of Fig. 2(b) we
obtain the following mutation points (the same result would
be obtained for Fig. 2(c)):
File Verifybb5Comp:
Mandatory mutations:
entry: FAILURE/bb, bb1: bb2/bb3
Optional mutations:
bb4: bb1/bb5
Notation bb: bb1/bb2 means that the block called bb must
be muted to hijack the control flow from block called bb1 to
block called bb2.
B. Mutants and multiple fault injections
Existing approaches consisting in building mutants for laser
attacks generally consider a single fault injection [15], [7].
Then, fault injection is encoded into mutants by explicitly
modifying the control flow, without taking into account the
flow induced by the current inputs. Fig 3 describes such
a transformation (colors are lost by mutation). Our objec-
(a) A mutation scheme
bb:
T F
bb2:bb1:
(b) A single mutation
bb:
 
bb1:
 
Fig. 3. Encoding Mutation independently of the current inputs
tive being to take into account multiple fault injections, we
could not reasonably produce one mutant per each possible
combination of fault injections. Thus, we produce a single
mutant encoding all possible fault injections (sometimes called
Higher Order Mutant [16]). To do so, we introduce a particular
variable, called fault, which is incremented each time an
attack effectively takes place. Furthermore, we use a lazy
approach in which faults are not necessarily injected if the
current flow follows a winning path. With this solution, we
exploit at the best the interaction between possible inputs and
fault injections, in order to minimize the number of laser shots.
C. Mandatory mutation operator
Mandatory mutation operator enforces the hijack of the
control flow just before a red node is going to be reached,
as described on Fig. 4. Contrary to Fig. 3, a fault is injected
only if the current flow does not follow a possibly winning
path. The new block bbTI is introduced to count the number
of fault injection (see Listing 2).
The mandatory mutation is implemented in LLVM as
described on Listing 2. In LLVM, a conditional branch is
of the form br i1 %Cond, label %bbTRUE, label
5Supposing the objective is connected to the entry point.
(a) A mutation scheme
bb:
T F
bb2:bb1:
(b) Our mandatory mutation
bb:
T F
bbTI:
 
bb1:
 
Fig. 4. Mutation operator when forcing a test inversion
%bbFALSE, where %Cond represents a 1-bit value. If this
value is evaluated to true (resp. false), control flows to the
%bbTRUE label argument (resp. %bbFALSE). The original br
instruction of the block we want to mutate (line 4) is replaced
by the one hijacking the control flow toward the bbTI block
(line 5) (semicolon introduces LLVM comments).
1 bb :
2 . . . ; Block t o m u t a t e
3
4 ; b r i 1 %Cond , l a b e l %bb1 , l a b e l %bb2 ; O r i g i n a l c o n d i t i o n
5 br i 1 %Cond , l a b e l %bb1 , l a b e l %bbTI ; Muta ted c o n d i t i o n
6
7 bbTI :
8 %mut 1 = l o a d i 3 2∗ @faul t , a l i g n 1 ; I n c r e m e n t s t h e
9 %mut 2 = add i 3 2 %mut 1 , 1 ; g l o b a l v a r i a b l e
10 s t o r e i 3 2 %mut 2 , i 3 2∗ @faul t , a l i g n 1 ; @fau l t
11 b r l a b e l %bb1 ;
Listing 2. LLVM mandatory mutation pattern
D. Optional mutation operator
In order to control the optional mutations (i.e. faults intro-
duced on a yellow node, see Table II), we add an extra boolean
variable (named activX) which must be valuated to 1 to
inject a fault. Fig. 5 explains how this mutation operates, trans-
forming Fig. 5(a) into Fig. 5(c). The two new blocks T1bb1
and T1bb2 control the introduction of faults, depending on
the value of variables activbb1 and activbb2 and the
two blocks T2bb1 and T2bb2 increment the fault number.
If bb2 is a green node the transformation 5(b) applies
(symmetrically if bb1 is green and bb2 yellow). In Listing
3 we give the LLVM code associated to blocks T1bb1 and
T2bb1.
1 T1bb1 :
2 %mut 1 = l o a d i 3 2∗ @activbb2 , a l i g n 1 ; t e s t on t h e
3 %mut 2 = icmp eq i 3 2 %mut 1 , 1 ; v a l u e o f
4 b r i 1 %mut 2 , l a b e l %T2bb1 , l a b e l %bb1 ; @act ivbb2
5
6 T2bb1 :
7 %mut 3 = l o a d i 3 2∗ @faul t , a l i g n 1 ; I n c r e m e n t s @fau l t
8 %mut 4 = add i 3 2 %mut 3 , 1
9 s t o r e i 3 2 %mut 4 , i 3 2∗ @faul t , a l i g n 1
10 br l a b e l %bb2
Listing 3. Optional mutation pattern
E. Mutant generation
Starting from an LLVM application code, a file name.ll,
and a file describing which nodes must be muted and
how (see example 3.1), we produce a mutant, named
(a) A mutation pattern 
bb:
T F
bb1:
 
bb2:
 
(b) bb2 being a green node
bb:
T F
bb2:
 
T1bb1:
T F
bb1:
 
bb2:
 
!(activbb2=1)
T2bb1:
 
activbb2
(c) Our optional mutation
bb:
T F
T1bb1:
T F
T1bb2:
T F
bb1:
 
bb2:
 
bb1:
 
bb2:
 
!(activbb2=1)
T2bb1:
 
activbb2=1 !(activbb1=1)
T2bb2:
 
activbb1=1
Fig. 5. Mutation operator when possibly inverting a test
NameMutComp.ll. Mutant generation is implemented into
a tool called Wolwerine (see Section V-B).
The mutant VerifyMutComp.ll, expressed as a C code
to be more readable, is given on Listing 4. According to
example 3.1, two mandatory mutations are introduced to avoid
the two red blocks bb2 and FAILURE (code corresponding
to these two blocks has been deleted). The local variable
activbb5 guards the activation of the fault consisting in
forcing the loop exit (optional mutation bb4: b1/bb5).
Function klee_make_symbolic (line 8) can be seen here
as a function assigning any value to the variable activbb5
(see Section IV-A for more explanations).
1BYTE V e r i f y (BYTE b u f f e r [ 4 ] ) {
2 i n t i =0 ; f a u l t =0 ;
3 / / Mandatory m u t a t i o n on e n t r y : FAILURE / bb
4 i f ( t r i e s L e f t <= 0) f a u l t ++;
5 / / O p t i o n a l m u t a t i o n on bb4 : bb1 / bb5
6 whi le ( i < 4) {
7 i n t a c t i v b b 5 ;
8 k lee make symbo l i c (& a c t i v b b 5 , s i z e o f ( i n t ) , ” a c t i v b b 5 ” ) ;
9 i f ( a c t i v b b 5 ==1) { f a u l t ++; break ;}
10 / / body e x e c u t i o n
11 / / Mandatory m u t a t i o n on bb1 : bb2 / bb3
12 i f ( b u f f e r [ i ] != p i n [ i ] ) f a u l t ++;
13 i ++ ;
14 }
15 / / Comparison i s s u c c e s s f u l : t h i s b l o c k i s a lways reached .
16 t r i e s L e f t = maxTr ies ;
17 a u t h e n t i c a t e d = 1 ;
18 re turn EXIT SUCCESS ;
19}
Listing 4. Mutant VerifyMutComp.ll stated in C
IV. FAULT INJECTIONS AND ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION
Starting from a mutant we want to determine if some attacks
exist, with how many fault injections and where. Due to the
chosen approach, where a single mutant is produced including
all possible fault injections, robustness can be evaluated using
a test generation process targeting a path coverage criterion.
Subsection IV-A explains how the test campaign is conducted
and Subsection IV-B how this result is exploited to evaluate
the robustness against fault injections.
A. Symbolic test generation
In order to combine at best inputs and fault injections, we
use a symbolic (or concolic) test case generation approach.
Our choice is bearing on KLEE [13], [4], a free symbolic test
generation tool for LLVM6. In KLEE, by default, variables
are considered as concrete ones. They can be declared as
symbolic (using the function klee_make_symbolic). Fur-
thermore, we can state assertions using the predefined function
klee_assume(pred), pred being a C condition. First we
build drivers for test generation in the following way:
1) add assertions characterising the inputs we want to take
into account ;
2) put an assertion to successively compute paths satisfy-
ing the following conditions: fault==0, fault==1,
fault==2 and fault>=3.
The case fault==0 corresponds to the case when the goal
can be reached without any attack using chosen inputs. In this
case there is a problem somewhere (either in the goal, or in the
chosen inputs, or in the application itself). Cases fault==1
and fault==2 give attack scenarios, according to the current
state of the art. In absence of such attacks, the last case
gives a measure of robustness: the minimal value of required
fault injections for the fault model under consideration. We
give in Listing 5 a KLEE driver associated to the function
Verify, where triesleft remains concrete (equals to 3)
and buffer is declared as symbolic (line 9) with each byte
constrained to be different from the expected pin value (line
13). Furthermore, paths with two fault injections are targeted
(line 15).
1 # d e f i n e SIZE OF PIN 4
2 # d e f i n e maxTr ies 3
3 t y p e d e f unsigned char BYTE;
4BYTE t r i e s L e f t = maxTr ies ;
5BYTE a u t h e n t i c a t e d = 0 ;
6BYTE p i n [ 4 ] = {( char ) 1 , ( char ) 2 , ( char ) 3 , ( char ) 4} ;
7 i n t f a u l t = 0 ;
8 i n t main ( void ) {
9 k lee make symbo l i c ( b u f f e r , s i z e o f (BYTE)∗SIZE OF PIN ,
10 ” b u f f e r ” ) ;
11 / / C o n d i t i o n s on t h e i n p u t b u f f e r
12 f o r ( i =0 ; i<SIZE OF PIN ; i ++)
13 {k lee a s sume ( b u f f e r [ i ] != p i n [ i ] ) ; }
14 V e r i f y ( b u f f e r ) ;
15 k l ee a s sume ( f a u l t == 2) ;
16}
Listing 5. A KLEE driver for function Verify
6Previous experiments have been made at the C code level using the
Pathcrawler tool [17], [18]
From this driver addressing the mutation of the function
Verify (Listing 4), KLEE produces inputs for all feasible
paths, according to the stated assertions. In particular all paths
introduced by our mutation scheme are explored (variables
activX being successively assigned with 0 and 1).
B. Robustness evaluation
Symbolic test generation tools may face two forms of
incompleteness: unbounded paths enumeration and undecid-
ability of constraints solving. Termination is then enforced
using timeouts. For a given driver, containing an assertion A1
on inputs and an assertion A2 stating a fault limit, robustness
evaluation is established according to table III.
Attack at least one executable paths ensuring A1 ∧ A2
Inconclusive a timeout detection and no attack produced
Robust no timeout and no attack
TABLE III
POSSIBLE VERDICTS ATTACHED TO A GIVEN DRIVER
These verdicts have been implemented using KLEE. This
tool produces one test case for each enumerated path re-
specting the assertions and a single test case violating each
assertion. It interacts with the solver STP [19]. By default,
KLEE can loop when paths (or number of paths) are infinite.
We developed a script adjusting KLEE parameters in order to
detect a timeout either during paths enumeration, or due to
STP limits.
For each produced test case, KLEE builds a file named
testX.ktest (X being the test case number) containing the
chosen values for symbolic variables activing a given path.
Symbolic inputs can be displayed using the KLEE’s ktest-tool
command. Additionally, KLEE produces a file .early when
a timeout is raised and a file called testX.user.err for
each test case X violating an assertion. Thus, we can conclude
on the robustness of an application depending on the presence
or the absence of these files, as shown Table IV.
Attack .ktest files
without a .user.err associated file
Inconclusive a .early file without attack
Robust no .early file and every .ktest file
associated with a .user.err file
TABLE IV
KLEE VERDICTS ATTACHED TO A GIVEN DRIVER
As pointed out in section III-A, the mutation strategy
Comp succeeds (i.e., reaches a block or not), only if the
execution terminates normally. Then, some executions can
diverge (looping forever or with an unpredictable behaviour
due to an execution error). Effect of execution errors, due
to an erroneous program or provoked by a fault injection, is
not addressed here. Nevertheless, thanks to KLEE, we can
identify attacks raising an execution error: KLEE produces a
particular error file depending on the error type, for instance
a testX.ptr.err file for a pointer error. Such attacks are
met in the example of section V-C.
Number of without with conditioned
fault injections any constraints on inputs inputs
fault ==0 1 0
fault ==1 x 1
fault ==2 x 1
fault >= 3 x 3
TABLE V
NUMBER OF POSSIBLE ATTACKS FOR VERIFY
C. Robustness evaluation for the function Verify
We make two experiments using the mutant
VerifyMutComp.ll. Results are presented Table V.
In the first experiment (column 2 of Table V) we use a driver
targeting 0 fault without any constraints on inputs, in order to
verify for which inputs the implementation is unsecure (here
when the attacker knows the right pin).
During the second experiment (column 3 of Table V) we
produce 4 drivers, instantiating the klee_assume with the
expected values of fault (0, 1, 2 and ≥ 3) and conditioned
inputs as stated on Listing 5. KLEE obviously supplies an
exhaustive coverage of all paths in a very negligible time.
This naive implementation of Verify presents one obvious
1-shot weakness (see Example 4.1). The 2-shots attack consists
in forcing the internal condition buffer[1]!=pin[1] and
then exiting the loop. Attacks with fault >=3 correspond
to forcing 2 or 3 times the internal condition and then the loop
exit, or to forcing 4 times the internal condition (example 4.2).
Example 4.1: A 1-shot attack scenario.
The attack column 3 line 3 consists in circumventing the
loop execution by the following sequence of fault injection:
<bb4:bb1/bb5>.
Example 4.2: A 4-shots attack scenario.
One possible 4-shots attack consists in the sequence
of fault injections <bb1:bb2/bb3, bb1:bb2/bb3,
bb1:bb2/bb3, bb1:bb2/bb3>, meaning that a fault is
injected four times on node bb1 to hijack the flow from bb2
to bb3. Input value produced by KLEE for buffer is 0000.
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Filtering Attacks
When dealing with non trivial examples, the number of
attacks found may combinatorially increase with the number
of injected faults, in particular due to the fact that we consider
volatile fault injections that can occur several times or at dif-
ferent locations of the execution. An obvious strategy consists
in first examining attacks with the smaller number of fault
injections. We propose here another complementary criterion,
taking into account program locations where faults should be
injected (physical realization of a given fault injection could
be more or less practicable). For a given attack a, seen as
an execution trace, we denote as Faults (a) the multi-set of
program locations where faults have been effectively injected.
Definition 5.1 defines a preorder relation between attacks.
Definition 5.1: A preorder relation  between attacks.
a1  a2 ≡ Faults (a1) ⊆ Faults (a2) (multi-set inclusion)
Number of All detected attacks With preorder filtering
fault ==0 0 0
fault ==1 1 1
fault ==2 1 0
fault >= 3 3 1
TABLE VI
ATTACKS FOR VERIFY AFTER SELECTION
Due to the fact that some attacks could diverge, we apply
this order only on attacks terminating normally. In this case we
first select the minimal elements with respect to the relation
. We give in Table VI the subset of attacks that fulfils our
selection criterion for the function Verify. Only attacks of
examples 4.1 and 4.2 are selected. Unselected attacks consist
in mutating the internal condition one, two or three times and
then forcing the loop exit: they are redundant with attack 4.1
in which the loop exit is directly forced. They include the set
of fault injection locations of attack 4.1, plus some other ones.
The proposed filtering criterion should be easely adapted to
take into account the difficulty of fault injection, depending
on the program location where it takes place. In practice,
one difficulty is to control physical fault injection in time,
i.e, when a given instruction is in progress (ongoing). To
do that, execution traces are analyzed, using observable side
channels such as power traces (for instance a peak due to a
cryptographic calculus) [9]. Therefore, injecting a fault at a
given instruction also depends on the preceding instruction.
Definition 5.1 should be refined in order to take into account
observable execution locations.
B. The Lazart Tool Suite
The cfg coloring process is implemented in a Java stan-
dalone tool, according to section II, and is no more detailed
here. The mutation production and robustness evaluation pro-
cesses consist in the following steps:
1) LLVM compilation (using llvm-gcc or clang)
2) Mutation generation (the Wolverine tool)
3) Symbolic analysis (using KLEE)
4) Attack filtering (an home-made script)
The structure of this tool suite is described Fig. 6. The main
and the target modules are LLVM bytecode files respectively
containing the main and the function targeted by the fault
injection. The fault model and the mutation strategy precise
which faults should be injected and where (the name of the
targeted function and the set of mutations to apply on each
block). Optionally a faults number limit l specifies a stopping
criterion for the symbolic analysis. We now describe the tasks
flow of the Lazart tool suite.
1) Mutant generation: Wolverine takes a mutation strategy
as input and automatically modifies the LLVM bytecode in
order to apply the corresponding mutation patterns. It also
produces a KLEE compatible driver. Wolverine was built to
be extensible to some other types of fault, through its strategy
parameter.
Fig. 6. The tool structure
2) Robustness evaluation: Then we use LLVM-LD, a linker,
which allows to combine several LLVM modules in a single
application. The resulting file is given to KLEE which pro-
duces test cases as described section IV.
3) Running tests: Test cases obtained from KLEE can
be executed using the native code supplied by LLVM-LD,
a testX.kest file and the libkleeRuntest library,
linking symbolic variables with their effective values.
4) Attack filter criterion: Attack execution traces are used
to implement the preorder relation between attacks (see section
V-A). Wolverine puts a printf call in the code each time a
fault is injected in order to log the source and the target blocks
of the control flow hijack. Then, after their execution, attacks
can be compared and classified.
C. Taking into account countermeasures
We now apply the Lazart approach on a more secured
implementation of the function Verify (inspired from [14]
and given Listing 6) in order to evaluate how countermeasures
are taken into account. Countermeasures introduced here are
the following ones:
• a backup of triesLeft is introduced
(triesLeftBackup) and compared with a copy
of triesLeft (the local variable t1 that will be stored
in RAM). If this copy and the backup value differ an
attack is detected (lines 11, 16 and 28)
• a step counter ensuring that the loop is really executed 4
times (incremented into the loop and tested at the end of
block bb12, line 31)
• a redundant test on the value of equal after the loop, in
order to detect a test inversion (blocks bb9 and bb10,
lines 23 and 25).
We now combine two attack objectives: in Fig. 7(a) we want
to reach bb12 (forcing the execution of authenticated=1
as before) and in Fig. 7(b) we want not to reach the block CM
(corresponding to the detection of an attack by a countermea-
sure). We obtain the following mutation directives:
Mandatory mutations:
entry: CM/bb, bb: bb1/bb2,
bb2: CM/bb3, <bb9: bb15/bb10,
bb10: CM/bb11, bb11: CM/bb12,
bb12: bb14/bb13
Optional mutations:
bb8: bb4/bb9, bb8: bb9/bb4,
bb4: bb5/bb6, bb4: bb6/bb5
(a) Colored CFG for bb12 to be reached
entry:
T F
CM:
bb:
T F
bb17:
bb1:
bb2:
T F
bb3:
return:
bb8:
T F
bb4:
T F
bb9:
T F
bb5: bb6:
bb7:
bb10:
T F
bb15:
T F
bb11:
T F
bb16:
bb12:
T F
bb13:
bb14:
(b) Colored CFG for CM not to reached
entry:
T F
CM:
bb:
T F
bb17:
bb1:
bb2:
T F
bb3:
return:
bb8:
T F
bb4:
T F
bb9:
T F
bb5: bb6:
bb7:
bb10:
T F
bb15:
T F
bb11:
T F
bb16:
bb12:
T F
bb13:
bb14:
Fig. 7. Colored CFGs with goals bb12 and CM
Considering conditioned inputs as before (see Listing 5),
Table VII shows that we obtain a path leading to an error
when we force the execution of the loop after 4 steps (an
out of bound error is detected by KLEE). This path is
denoted by 1∗ in Table VII and requires to be examined
as a potential attack, depending on the execution platform.
We now have two 2-shots attacks (line 4 of Table VII). The
first one corresponds to the injection of faults successively
on the two conditions equal==BOOL_TRUE (bb9) and
equal!=BOOL_TRUE (bb10). The second one corresponds
to the the 1-shot attack of example 4.1 that now requires two
shots: one to circumvent the loop execution and another one
to hijack the countermeasure relative to the the step counter
value (line 31).
Number of All detected attacks With preorder filtering
fault ==0 0 0
fault ==1 1∗ 1∗
fault ==2 2 2
fault ==3 5 0
fault ==4 11 1
fault >=5 13 0
TABLE VII
RESULTS FOR SECURED VERIFY
This example also shows that we can relate countermea-
sures and fault injections. Countermeasures can be seen as
blocks directly leading to a state detecting an attack (here the
block CM). For instance the orange nodes of Fig. 7(b), i.e.
1 s i gne d char t r i e s L e f t = maxTr ies ;
2 s i gne d char t r i e s L e f t B a c k u p = −maxTr ies ;
3BYTE e q u a l = BOOL TRUE;
4BYTE a u t h e n t i c a t e d = 0 ;
5BYTE p i n [ 4 ] ={ ( char ) 0 , ( char ) 1 , char ( 2 ) , char ( 3 ) } ;
6BYTE V e r i f y ( char b u f f e r [ 4 ] ) {
7 i n t i ;
8 / / BLOCK e n t r y
9 i n t s t e p C o u n t e r = INITIAL VALUE ;
10 s h o r t char t 1 = t r i e s L e f t ;
11 i f ( t 1 != −t r i e s L e f t B a c k u p ) goto CM ;
12 / / BLOCK bb
13 i f ( t r i e s L e f t <= 0) re turn EXIT FAILURE ;
14 / / BLOCK bb2
15 t1−−; t r i e s L e f t = t 1 ; t r i e s L e f t B a c k u p ++;
16 i f ( t r i e s L e f t != −t r i e s L e f t B a c k u p ) goto CM ;
17 / / BLOCK bb3
18 e q u a l = BOOL TRUE;
19 f o r ( i = 0 ; i < 4 ; i ++)
20 { e q u a l = e q u a l &(( b u f f e r [ i ] ! = p i n [ i ] ) ?BOOL FALSE :
BOOL TRUE) ;
21 s t e p C o u n t e r ++; } ;
22 / / BLOCK bb9
23 i f ( e q u a l == BOOL TRUE) {
24 / / BLOCK 10
25 i f ( e q u a l != BOOL TRUE) goto CM ;
26 / / BLOCK bb11
27 t r i e s L e f t = maxTr ies ; t r i e s L e f t B a c k u p = −maxTr ies ;
28 i f ( t r i e s L e f t != −t r i e s L e f t B a c k u p ) goto CM ;
29 / / BLOCK bb12
30 a u t h e n t i c a t e d = 1 ;
31 i f ( s t e p C o u n t e r == INITIAL VALUE + 4)
32 / / BLOCK bb13
33 re turn EXIT SUCCESS ; }
34 / / BLOCK bb14 : e l s e p a r t o f b l o c k bb12
35 / / f o l l o w e d by b l o c k CM
36 e l s e { / / Comparison f a i l e d
37 a u t h e n t i c a t e d = 0 ;
38 i f ( s t e p C o u n t e r == INITIAL VALUE + 4)
39 / / BLOCK bb16
40 re turn EXIT FAILURE ; }
41 / / BLOCK CM
42 CM : p r i n t f ( ” Card b l o c k e d .\ n ” ) ;
43 re turn EXIT FAILURE ;
44}
Listing 6
A SECURED IMPLEMENTATION OF VERIFY
entry, bb2, bb10, bb11, bb12, reaching block CM
can be identified as containing countermeasures. Generated
attacks only imply nodes bb10 and bb12. We can conclude
that countermeasures in entry, bb2 and bb11 are not
related to fault injections by test inversion for the considered
inputs (TryLeft being set to 3) . Thus, using reachability or
unreachability objectives, we are able to determine if a given
countermeasure can be raised and for which inputs.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. Our Contribution
In the context of smart card application certification, we
propose an innovative approach allowing us to establish com-
mensurable verdicts (existence or absence of attacks relatively
to a set of possible inputs), unlike other approaches using
an empirical testing phase to check if some mutants can be
exercised by some inputs, and if such executions are really
dangerous ones (i.e. not detected by countermeasures). Fur-
thermore, as shown in section V-C, we are able to evaluate how
embedded countermeasures are related to attack detections. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to built mutant
taking into consideration multiple shots fault injection during
a run, according to the next state-of-the art in term of laser
attacks.
The proposed approach is supported by an effective tool
suite, as described section V-B4. It is based on a robust and
efficient symbolic test generator, used in industrial contexts
[20], [21]. LLVM appears to be a suitable code level both to
produce mutants and to take into account optimisations, thanks
to the analysis and transform passes offered by the LLVM
platform [22]. Thus, several level of optimised codes can be
considered, bridging the gap between high level attacks and
effective attacks, made at the binary level.
Regarding mutation, as pointed out in [23], [24], combin-
ing mutation production and symbolic test generation offers
several advantages. Firstly, we conjointly address the problem
of building mutants and how they can be activated. Secondly,
thanks to the efficiency of the KLEE path-coverage strategy,
we are able to master the combinatorial explosion inherent
to multiple and volatile fault injections, in combining at best
inputs and faults injection and in pruning as soon as possi-
ble paths violating stated assertions relative to the expected
number of faults.
To complete the evaluation of the Lazart approach, we
experimented it on a cryptographic detector for ssh, execut-
ing some checks allowing to verify the integrity of pack-
ets (see [25] for attacks on ssh packets). We tested the
detect_attack function provided in OpenSSH 6.2 [26]
(70 lines of C code and a cfg with 32 basic blocks). Our
objective was to hijack the function verdict (i.e, to report as
correct a corrupted packet). The cfg coloring step produced
15 mutations. We ran Klee looking for possible attacks in
less than 3 fault injections, with a symbolic 1024 size buffer.
We found a 1-shot attack (inverting a check about the packet
length), and a 3-shots attack (redundant with the previous
one, according to definition 5.1). Although the code structure
is similar to the one of the Verify example, this example
involves more complex arithmetic computations, a large sym-
bolic buffer and much larger iteration depths. However, the
results were produced in a few minutes.
B. Related work
Fault injection by laser attacks is a hot topic in the domain
of smartcard vulnerability analysis (and generally mobile
devices). Thus, several recent works are related to this subject.
For instance Lanet et al. [15], [11] produce mutants for
smart card fault injection for Java card applications. Based
on a fault model at the byte level [5], they produce a set of
mutants by mutating one byte code operation per mutant. This
way, they encompass a large set of fault injection impacts,
for one shot laser attacks. For dangerousness detection, they
propose a set of syntactic heuristics to conduct a risk anal-
ysis for each mutant. Furthermore, they use the annotation
facility offered by Java Card 3.0 to annote applications with
declared countermeasures. Their impacts are then measured by
a symbolic execution interpreting annotations. This approach
mainly targets Java Card developers in offering a framework to
evaluate countermeasures accuracy, according to a given fault
model. It differs from Lazart in several points: only single
permanent fault injections are considered and countermeasures
must be explicitly declared. On the contrary they consider a
more general fault model.
In [7] Berthome´ et al. produce C mutants corresponding to
a single permanent fault injection, also targeting control flow
hijacking. There are some similarities with our approach, in
the sense they try to bridge the gap between the assembly code
and the source code by modelling and simulating the effect of
physical attacks directly at high level. One interesting aspect
of [7], [12] is the systematic study of attacks targeting control
flow shifting and how mutant for NOP and JUMP attacks can
be systematically produced. Mutants are to be used against a
low level attack platform and predefined test scenarii in order
to verify that abstract mutants are covered by concrete fault
injections. In contrast, Lazart approach aims to exploit abstract
models to produce a robustness verdict and existing attacks.
In a very recent work [8], [27], the author focus on fault
injection consisting in modifying memory values (a classical
attack for cryptographic algorithms), aiming to formally prove
the robustness of a given application. Starting from a C
code, the author produce mutants for a single fault injection,
adding an extra parameter similar to the one introduced in our
optional mutation operator. This parameter is used to logically
express a robustness property stating that if a fault has been
introduced, the program stops in error (a countermeasure state
for instance). Robustness property is established using the
weakest precondition plugin Jessy of the Frama-C platform
[28], [29]. The use of a symbolic test case generator in Lazart,
contrary to a theorem-proving approach, allows us either to
establish the robustness or to produce attacks. Furthermore,
mixing concrete and symbolic computation steps allows us
to automatically treat applications with complex arithmetic
computation (such as shift and hash function), as met in the
ssh experimentation. It is not sure that such applications can
be easely treated by a theorem-proving approach.
C. Perspectives
In parallel with experimentations, we are currently develop-
ing this work following two main axes.
First we are studying how to extend our approach to
other forms of attacks on control flow hijacking such as
circumventing or forcing some calls, or forcing some block
execution depending on the code layout. This attack objective
can be realized, for instance, in injecting NOP instruction or
in changing the destination address of JUMP, as proposed in
[7]. For these attack objectives, the Lazart approach appears
to be extensible in adding or modifying some edges in the
control flow graphs. We are currently extending the coloring
algorithm to take into account inter-procedural analysis.
Secondly we are studying how to combine some aspects of
the Lazart approach (in particular graph coloring and mutation
strategies) with a (brute force) dynamic testing approach at
the byte level, in order to guide fault injections at execution
time. Nevertheless, static analysis and cfg production are more
challenging when low level codes are concerned [30].
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